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ABSTRACT

Whether or not there can be occasions on which judgments of
responsibility for another's misfortune reflect an observer's
self-protective motives has, for a long time, been an area of
controversy between "rational" and "motivational" attribution
paradigms.
So far, attribution theorists have found evidence for
two self-protective motives that influence a perceiver1s
responsibility judgments, namely a need to believe in a just world
and Shaver's (1970) relevance-dependent model of defensive
attribution.
Although there is evidence to support both the just
world and defensive hypotheses, the present study considered only
the latter.
Despite the evidence, however, the rationalists
insist that findings are inconsistent and confusing, criticizing
the research on both conceptual and methodological grounds
(Tetlock & Levi, 1982).
Responding to these criticisms was the
major thrust of the present study.

Attention was paid specifically to (a) clearing up any
conceptual confusion, (b) disentangling situational possibility
and personal similarity, (c) extending the original defensive
model to allow for victim as well as perpetrator attributions, and
(d) enhance the experimental realism that is crucial to arousing
self-protective motives.
Situational possibility, personal
similarity, and target person served as independent variables.
The experimental conditions were manipulated in the context of a
cover story designed to elicit subjects' evaluations of a target
person's communication skills.
Two basic vignettes were used and,
depending on the experimental condition, subjects observed (on
videotape) a different or similar target person tell how he or she
was either the perpetrator or victim of a situationally possible
or situationally not possible accident, satisfying all
combinations of the three factor experimental design.
Following
the videotaped presentation, subjects were given a series of
questions designed to examine attributions of responsibility and
to check the manipulations.

Results did not support Shaver's (1970) model of defensive
attribution.
The critical three-way interaction did not obtain as
predicted.
It was suggested, however, that due, once again, to
methodological problems, the original defensive model was not
fairly tested.
Manipulations checks revealed that (a) the
strength of the crucial threat arousing situational possibility
variable was questionable, and (b) perpetrators were perceived
more as victims than as perpetrators, manipulation failures that
vi

cast doubt on the rest of the results.

In sum, what seemed like a reasonable way to enhance realism
and get subjects more involved resulted in yet another
methodological fiasco.
Apparently, subjects do respond to a live
performance, but the response should be to the stimulus story and
not just to the person delivering it.
Because the critical
situational possibility was weak, it might be a good idea to
preselect a sample for whom a particular negative event would be
especially threatening.

Motivated Distortion:
Effects of Situational and Personal Relevance
on Attributions of Responsibility to Victims and
Perpetrators
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How do individuals decide whom to blame for harmful
outcomes?

Understandably,

the business of determining

responsibility for an instance of misfortune is seldom left
up to an individual involved in its production.

The

decision instead becomes the task of an observer who, unlike
the causal agent whose self-protective motives would be
expected,
processor.

is presumed to be a "rational" informationWhether or not there can be occasions on which

judgments of responsibility for another's misfortune reflect
an observer's self-protective motives has,

for a long time,

been an area of controversy between "rational" and
"motivational" attribution paradigms (Tetlock & Levi, 1982).
Proponents of the "rational" explanation of how
responsibility judgments are made argue that the perceiver
is an intuitive scientist (Kelley,

1967) searching for an

accurate account of events, who sometimes makes inferential
errors

(Ajzen & Fishbein,

Fischhoff,

1975,

1976; Miller & Ross,

1983; Brewer,

1977;

1975; Nisbett & Ross, 1980).

Some even go so far as to say that motivated distortion is
conceptually unlikely (Ajzen & Fishbein,
and Ross,

1977).

Note, however,

1983; Brewer,

1977;

that such a claim is

inconsistent with other well documented social psychological
phenomena (e.g., cognitive dissonance and equity theories)
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that clearly presume a self-serving (motivated) distortion
of reality.

Why then should attribution processes be any

different?
The relevant question is:

under what conditions would

a perceiver's attributional behavior be influenced by selfprotective motives?

Motivationalists contend that

attributions are susceptible to motivated distortion when an
individual (actor or observer) has something personally at
stake.

Hedonic relevance was used by Jones and Davis (1965)

as a measure of the degree to which an observer perceives
that some outcome has,
consequences.

for him or her, positive or negative

Individuals, be they personally involved in

some misfortune or a witness to it, are motivated to protect
themselves against any manner of perceived threat.

Whether

it is perceived threat of potential blame or harm that
motivates observers to self-servingly distort reality has
not yet been decided.
So far, attribution theorists have found evidence for
two self-protective motives that influence a perceiver's
responsibility judgments.

The first of these is a need to

believe in a just world wherein justice and order prevail
and all instances of misfortune are somehow deserved.
Supporters of this view (e.g., Lerner & Matthews,

1967;
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Lerner & Miller,

1978) argue that in order to be reassured

that suffering does not capriciously befall undeserving
individuals, perceivers will find victims either
behaviorally or characterologically at fault.
fault has to do with actions;

Behavioral

it is the attribution made to

a victim who could have foreseen catastrophe but did nothing
to circumvent it or whose actions directly contributed to
his or her own victimization.

The perceiver reasons that

the victim's suffering was a direct consequence of his or
her action (or failure to a c t ) , a mistake that the perceiver
certainly would not make were she or he to be in that same
situation.

Characterological fault, on the other hand,

is

the only self-protective choice when a threatened perceiver
cannot find fault with the victim's actions.

In other

w o r d s , if a victim neither foresees nor contributes in the
behavioral sense to personal victimization,

the threatened

perceiver cannot be assured that he or she will not likewise
be a chance victim,

and will choose to believe instead that

the victim was a bad person who got what was deserved.
The second possible motivated distortion of
responsibility is Shaver's (1970) relevance-dependent model
of defensive attribution, which deals with attributions made
to perpetrators.

Prerequisite to the "defensive" process is

Motivated Distortion

situational possibility,

such that a perceiver must be able

to see himself or herself as a potential perpetrator of
misfortune,
avoid.

the blame for which the perceiver would want to

Given situational possibility, where personal

similarity between perceiver and perpetrator is low,
attributions of responsibility to that perpetrator will be
exaggerated.

Conversely,

to the degree that personal

similarity is high (and situational possibility remains
h i g h ) , responsibility attributions to the perpetrator will
be minimized and the claim will be instead that the
misfortune was a result of chance or bad luck.

Together,

situational possibility and personal similarity comprise
what Shaver (1970) calls "relevance."

Whereas situational

possibility is the necessary (but insufficient) component of
relevance, personal similarity determines the particular
direction of the attributional distortion.
It is important to note here that although the two
motivational hypotheses make different empirical predictions
they, nonetheless, have at least one critical thing in
common.

Both just world and defensive attribution describe

how attributions are made for unintentional behavior;
evidence for motivated distortion necessarily depends on the
absence of intention.

If truly dispositional character
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flaws are demonstrated veridically in intentional behavior
(Davis & Shaver,

1985),

there would be no opportunity for

perceiver misperceptions.

In terms of Heider's

levels of responsibility, a victim's behavior,

(1958)
in the just-

world sense for example, generally does not exceed
foreseeability, meaning that a rational judgment is affected
by the extent to which the victim should have known better.
For a perpetrator,

causal participation is undeniable but,

according to defensive attribution,
intent.

still does not involve

Without clear-cut intent then, perceivers are

required to make judgment calls,

and it is doubtful that

responsibility judgments are always made objectively
(Shaver,

1985).

Indeed, recent research conducted by Thornton (1984)
makes a strong case in favor of motivated distortion of some
kind in the attribution of responsibility.

In the first of

two experiments, Thornton provided subjects with an
alternative explanation for negative emotion experienced as
a result of a fellow student's victimization (i.e.,
perceived situational and personal relevance).

They were

told that subjects commonly experience feelings of anxiety
or apprehension in an experimental setting.

Thornton

hypothesized that if arousal from possible threat (perceived

Motivated Distortion

relevance) does in fact give rise to motivated distortion,
then the opportunity to otherwise explain negative affect
would serve to reduce responsibility attributed to the
victim.

This hypothesis was corroborated.

In his second

experiment, Thornton manipulated private self-awareness in
an effort to augment subjects'

attention to threat arousal

(again, perceived situational and personal relevance).

This

time no mention was made of anxiety commonly experienced by
subjects in experimental settings.

Perceived situational

and personal relevance were again manipulated in the context
of the story of a fellow student's victimization.

But with

no alternative explanation for the negative affect (threat
arousal) subjects increased attributed responsibility to the
victim,

a finding that, when coupled with the results of

Thornton's first experiment, produced convergent evidence to
show motivational influence on attributional behavior.
persuasive as Thornton's (1984) research is, however,

As
it

does not settle all of the important questions.
Specifically,

it does not adequately compare the

attributions made to perpetrators of harm with those made to
victims,

and is therefore a good example of why rationalists

complain that the motivational paradigm is conceptually
imprecise.

Motivated Distortion
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To recapitulate:

the just world theory deals with

threatened perceivers who make self-protective behavioral
and characterological attributions to victims in order to be
reassured that the future is under control; whereas
defensive attribution deals with threatened perceivers who,
depending on perceived situational and personal relevance,
attribute varying degrees of responsibility to perpetrators
and/or chance.

Just world and defensive attribution are

clearly two conceptually different accounts of influences on
responsibility judgments for which different predictions are
required.

Regrettably,

in the literature,

has not always been preserved.

this distinction

Previous studies have not

been sufficiently careful with the particular manipulations
that are conceptually called for in either the just world
(victim innocence) or the defensive attribution
(perpetrator/perceiver relevance) hypotheses.

Nor has

interpretation of results settled the important issues,
largely because dependent measures typically ask for either
perpetrator or victim attributions but not both.

Built into

the present study was a precise treatment of the former,
while still permitting the latter.

Although there is

evidence to support both the just world and "defensive"
hypotheses,

the present study considered only the latter.

Motivated Distortion

In a meta-analysis of defensive attribution research,

Burger

(1981) found support for Shaver's (1970) relevance-dependent
model, but did note that the situational and personal
elements of relevance

(because they are presumed to be

orthogonal) needed to be manipulated independently.

It was

also pointed out that specific manipulation of personal
similarity is difficult because it is necessarily confounded
with situational relevance.

A major purpose of the present

study was to directly and independently manipulate the
situational possibility and personal similarity variables
that Shaver (1970) claims are prerequisite to defensive
behavior and also to disentangle and directly measure the
two on separate dependent v a riables.
Despite the evidence,

the rationalists insist that none

so far irrefutably corroborates "defensive" claims,
criticizing the research on both conceptual and
methodological grounds

(Tetlock & Levi,

1982).

That

conceptual models have been used to make predictions for
which they were not intended is a major reason why results
have been confusing.

For example,

recent work claiming to

represent defensive attribution (e.g., Janoff-Bulman,
Janoff-Bulman, T i m k o , & Carli,
Tennen, Affleck, & Gershman,

1985; Karuza & Carey,

1986),

1979;
1984;

argues that Shaver's

Motivated Distortion
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(1970) manipulation of the relevance variables will
influence responsibility attributions when the stimulus
person is a victim rather than a perpetrator.

Follow up

research conducted by Thornton (in press) again looks at the
influence "relevance" has on responsibility attributed to
victims -- another misapplication of the "defensive" model
that serves to perpetuate the confusion.
Shaver's

To reiterate:

(1970) original model did not consider attributions

to victims,

so the second major purpose of the present study

was to make just such a comparison.

Consequently, half of

the subjects evaluated the responsibility of a perpetrator,
while half evaluated the responsibility of a victim.
The defensive model has also been criticized on
methodological grounds, undoubtedly the most serious of
which is lack of experimental realism (Aronson & Carlsmith,
1968).

To begin with,

a situation must somehow be involving

to a perceiver before he or she will relate to its
consequences.

Trivial events tend to be easily dismissed

(Vidmar & Crinklaw,
for causality,

1974).

For mild outcomes,

responsibility,

concern (Schroeder & Linder,

implications

and blame are not a big

1976).

A severe outcome,

however, has rather unpleasant implications to a perceiver
for whom the situation is relevant.

Perceived threat,

Motivated Distortion
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sufficient to arouse self-protective motives,

is then a

function of outcome severity only after situational and
personal relevance have been established (Shaver,

1970).

Likewise, perceived similarity between a perceiver and
the stimulus person involved in an instance of misfortune,
enhances realism and facilitates perceiver involvement
(i.e., the same thing could happen to him or her).

A less

compelling experimental setting simply would not arouse
threat,

and self-protective motives would not be evoked in

the absence of personal threat.

In order to ensure realism,

the present study utilized the medium of video to present
vignettes that had been pretested for effectiveness.
Second,

in a review of the defensive attribution

literature, Vidmar and Crinklaw (1974) take issue with
operationally imposed inferential sets (Jones & Thibaut,
1958) that they claim confuse empirical findings.

For

example, where experimental demand for accuracy and
objectivity is overemphasized,
perceivers

(Heider,

subjects cease to be "naive"

1958) who seek to find support for value

maintenance and become instead clinicians who want to
understand the processes that underlie human behavior or
trial jurors who evaluate situations relative to societal
norms.

Results of previous studies suggest that subjects

Motivated Distortion
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suppressed normal

(naive) responses in the interest of

objectivity (Shaver,

1970).

Subjects,

in the present study,

were encouraged to give "gut level" responses;
accuracy and objectivity were eliminated,

if demand for

subjects would be

free to respond more instinctually.
Still another criticism of the "defensive" research
comes from Fishbein and Ajzen (1973), who contend that
ambiguous experimental contexts yield uninterpretable
results.

They argue that when contextual responsibility

level is not designated and held constant,

subjects

arbitrarily attribute responsibility at different levels.
Defending the need for situational ambiguity,

Shaver (1973)

states that levels studies and motivated distortion of
responsibility have different purposes and methods.

In

order to identify which factors motivate an observer to
misperceive the causal chain of events,
ambiguity is essential.

situational

The predicted effect, and therefore

justification for contextual ambiguity, has been
demonstrated by Phares and Wilson (1972).

By manipulating

situational information (ambiguous versus structured) and
outcome severity (severe versus m i l d ) , Phares and Wilson
(1972) found an interaction such that severe outcomes
produce attenuated responsibility attributions only when the

Motivated Distortion
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connection between stimulus person and outcome is unclear.
Attributed responsibility is high,

on the other hand, where

connection between the stimulus person and outcome is
direct,

apparently because guilt is obvious.

Providing an

opportunity for subjects to attribute responsibility on
level-specific dependent measures was a reasonable way to
both preserve the necessary situational ambiguity and
control for levels confusion.
The last methodological objection to be raised is that
of inadequate dependent measures.

Responsibility

attributions have,

in the past, been measured

unidimensionally.

That is, subjects typically assign

responsibility on a single rating scale where endpoints are
"not at all responsible" and "completely responsible."
being the case,

subjects have no opportunity to indicate at

which of Heider's
causality,

This

(1958) levels (e.g., association,

foreseeability,

intention, and justification)

the

greatest attributed responsibility occurs (Ajzen & Fishbein,
1973; Burger,

1981).

Precise measurement of attributed

responsibility requires several unidimensional scales

(i.e.,

an independent rating scale for each of the responsibility
levels), an improvement that would allow researchers to
calculate "the probability that a relation exists between a

Motivated Distortion
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stimulus person and a certain magnitude of responsibility of
a certain qualitative type"
126).

(Vidmar & Crinklaw,

In response to this criticism,

1974, p.

the present study

disentangled the "generic" measure of responsibility by
allowing subjects to make independent attributions at each
responsibility level.
It was the overall purpose of this study to select
variables that would precisely test the defensive
attribution hypothesis and, at the same time, control for
confounds that often undermine this effort.

Situational

possibility (high, low), personal similarity (similar,
different) and stimulus person (perpetrator, victim) served
as independent variables with outcome severity kept high
across all conditions.

Because Shaver's

(1970) defensive

model presumes an inverse relationship between personal
similarity and responsiblity attributed to perpetrators,

as

well as between chance and responsibility attributed to
perpetrators,
1.

it was predicted that:

Where situational possibility is high,

the responsibi lity

attributed to a similar perpetrator will be minimal and
chance attributions will be high.
2.

Where situational possibility is again high but the
perpetrator is different,

responsibility attributions

Motivated Distortion
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will be exaggerated and personal similarity will be
denied.
3.

Where situational possibility is low there should be
no differential responsibility attributed to
perpetrators based on similarity, because insufficient
threat will not arouse self-protective motives.

4.

If this original model is correct, an interaction
between situational possibility and personal
similarity will be obtained only when the target
person is a perpetrator.

Motivated Distortion
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Method
Subj ects
Subjects were 96 female undergraduates enrolled in
Introductory Psychology courses at the College of William
and Mary.

Because there is the potential for differential

responsibility attribution across gender,
use only female subjects.

it was decided to

All subjects received credit

toward fulfillment of a research requirement by taking part
in the experiment.
Stimulus Materials
The experimental conditions were manipulated in the
context of a cover story designed to elicit subjects'
evaluations of communication skills.

In order to respond to

prior criticism of the "paper and pencil" nature of many
defensive attribution studies,

the present research utilized

videotaped stimulus materials presented in a manner designed
to be highly involving to subjects.

Two basic vignettes

were used and, depending on the experimental condition,
subjects observed (on videotape) a different or similar
target person tell how he or she was either the perpetrator
or victim of a situationally possible or situationally not
possible accident,

satisfying all combinations of the three

factor experimental design.

For all conditions, precise
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contents of the stimulus stories were determined after
pretesting.

After viewing the videotape,

subjects completed

a number of questions designed to examine attributions of
responsibility and to check the manipulations.

Finally,

the

subjects completed the Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau,
1975) intended for use as a covariate in the design,

on the

assumption that individual differences might affect the
attributions of behavioral and characterological fault to
victims.
Situational Possibility.

Pretesting was done to

guarantee that the accidents recalled by stimulus persons
were perceived as either very likely or very unlikely to
happen to the subjects.

Subjects'

perceptions of

situational possibility is crucial to the arousal of selfprotective motives.
From an initial set of 12 vignettes, pretested subjects
selected a hunting accident (very unlikely to happen to
them) and a hospital accident (very likely to happen to
them).

The hunting vignette finds Henry (different) and

Susan (similar) visiting their grandparents in Michigan's
Upper Peninsula.

Susan has serious reservations about how

"sporting” deerhunting is, but is persuaded by Henry (her
brother)

to at least come along and enjoy the gorgeous out-

Motivated Distortion
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of-doors.

The decision to go hunting that day turned out to

be a disastrous one for them both;

depending on the

experimental condition (each is alternately perpetrator or
victim),

Susan (or Henry) stumbles, with a gun that is

loaded but not safety locked, and accidently shoots the
other.

In the hospital vignette, Henry and Susan appear

either as part-time worker or patient,

during a time of

emergency that calls staff away from their respective posts.
With no nursing personnel in attendance,
for brain damage due to high fever,

a patient,

at risk

is unwittingly given

medication to which he or she is allergic.

A near death

episode turns out to be traumatic for both Henry and Susan.
Personal Similarity.
similarity,

To manipulate personal

subjects were presented with a personality

sketch of an individual who was either very similar to or
very different from the average William and Mary student.
Using combinations of several dimensions on which
individuals are likely to base similarities and differences
(e.g.,

gender,

aspirations,

age, home region, political orientation,

educational background,

general interests,

and

taste in m u s i c ) , pretesting for effectiveness of the
manipulation was done.

Again,

the intention was to make the

stimulus person and subject as similar or different as
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possible.

Competence and likeability of the stimulus

person, however, were held constant.
Based on six pretesting choices,
most strongly with Susan,

subjects identified

a 19 year-old "yuppie"-type from

Northern Virigina, whose goals were an MBA and a husband who
would support her career pursuits.
shape, meeting new people,
intercollegiate sports,
found Henry,

She liked staying in

sorority life, movies,

and the Police.

Pretested subjects

a 19 year-old Topanga Canyon liberal,

someone with whom they did not at all identify.
people,

good conversation,

to his convictions.
exercise,

the out-of-doors,

to be

He liked

and being true

Henry scoffed at Capitalism, marriage,

and "preppies."

Personality profiles

(one to a

subject) were distributed to subjects at the start of each
experimental session.
Target P e r s o n .

Target person type (i.e., perpetrator

or victim of misfortune) was conveyed via the content of the
particular vignette.

The target person told the story of

how he or she was either the victim of a hospital
hunting) accident,
another.

(or

or the perpetrator of harmdoing to

For the perpetrator manipulation,

the absence of

intent was made evident.
Dependent M e a s u r e s .

The subjects were given a series

Motivated Distortion
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of questions designed to examine attributions of
responsibility and to check the manipulations.
questions were scored as 7 -point scales.
cover story,

All

To enhance the

subjects first rated the stimulus p e r s o n ’s

communication skills by responding to questions like "How
well did Henry (or Susan) enunciate?," "how appropriate was
Henry's

(or Susan's) speaking tempo?," and "was the degree

of expressed emotionality appropriate to the content of
event recalled?"

Attributions of responsibility were

measured on several unidimensional scales.
levels

(Heider,

1958), for example,

Responsibility

included "how

foreseeable do you think the accident should have been to
Henry (or Susan)?," and "to what extent did Henry (or Susan)
intentionally cause the accident?"

The dimensions

(Shaver,

1985) of responsibility included questions like "to what
extent do you believe that Henry (or Susan) was the direct
cause as opposed to an indirect contributing cause of his or
her own misfortune?," and "to what extent do you believe
that Henry's

(or Susan's) actions were coerced as opposed to

voluntary?"

Attributed behavioral and characterological

fault were indexed and validated (using Cronbach's alpha
coefficient)

for internal consistency (Cronbach,

1951).

To

measure behavioral fault, subjects were asked "how strongly
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do you feel that there were actions that Henry (or Susan)
could have taken to prevent what happened to him or h e r ? ,"
"to what extent do you believe that Henry (or Susan) could
have done otherwise?," and "how strongly do you feel that
what happened to Henry (or Susan) was a result of his or her
own actions?"

Characterological fault was measured by

asking "to what extent can Henry (or Susan) be considered
responsible for what happened to him or her because of the
kind of person that he or she is?," "to what degree would
you say that Henry (or Susan)

is a well-adjusted

individual?," and "how morally accountable do you believe
Henry (or Susan) was for his or her behavior?"

Next,

perceived probabilities were assessed by asking "how likely
is it that the accident would have occurred regardless of
any intervention by Henry (or Susan)?," and "how likely is
it for the accident to occur given the behavior of Henry (or
Susan)?"

Manipulation checks asked "the likelihood that

such an accident could happen to y o u ? ," to what degree are
you and Henry (or Susan) similar in terms of beliefs,
values,

and attitudes?,"

"to what degree is Henry (or Susan)

intrinsically likeable regardless of how you personally
relate to him or her?," "to what degree do you believe that
Henry (or Susan) was the victim of misfortune?," and "to
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what degree do you believe that Henry (or Susan) was the
perpetrator of harm to another?"

Finally,

subjects

completed the 20-item Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau,
1975).
Procedure
Subjects were recruited for a study of "communication
skills."

Each of the eight videotapes was viewed by a total

of 12 subjects who were run in groups of four.

To be sure

that subject responses were individual and not a group
effect,

subjects were seated side by side at a long table

with partitions in between them that extended beyond the
table.

Also,

included in the instructions was a caution

against talking or making any emotional displays in response
to the materials that would be shown on the screen.
Videotapes were presented three times each in random order
to minimize time of day effects.

In all cases subjects

heard the following explanation:
It is generally agreed that self-efficacy is
contingent on an individual's communication skill.
In order to attain a measure of gratification in
life, whether it be in the workplace or in personal
relationships,

one must be able to communicate

personal needs and expectations to involved p a r t i e s .
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Regrettably,
been

communication

emphasized.

self-satisfaction,

skills have not typically

Owing to the current focus on
research is being done to

facilitate effective interpersonal communication.
Subjects were asked to evaluate the communication
skills of a target person (Henry or Susan) who, having been
traumatized (either by perpetrating harm or victimized by
it) was videotaped while telling his or her story to a
counselor at a local support group (American Trauma
society).

During the first few debriefing sessions,

subjects said they knew that Henry and Susan were actors.
The cover

story was,

following explanation:

therefore, adjusted to include the
Because

videotaping clients who have

presented themselves for counseling is a violation of
confidentiality, you will be observing a reinactment of the
actual storytelling only this time told by actors.

It was

further explained that "observing a videotaped communication
may seem too laboratory-like, but complex research of this
sort requires isolation of the various elements of the
communication process."

In an attempt to make the exercise

subject-relevant, subjects were told that, ultimately,
would be asked to summarize communicator strengths and
shortcomings relative to themselves.

All subjects were

they
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thoroughly debriefed at the conclusion of the experiment,
and arrangements were made at that time for communicating
research results to all those who were interested.
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Results
All data were subjected to three different analyses.
The first was a 2 x 2 x 2 (Situational Possibility x
Personal Similarity x Target Person) between-subjects
analysis of variance.

The second was a 2 x 2 x 2

(Situational Possibility x Personal Similarity x Target
Person) between-subjects analysis of covariance, with mean
scores on the Just World Scale as the covariate.

Although

the covariate was significant on several of the dependent
measures

(i.e., responsibility, blame,

adjustment,

chance, personal

intelligence, moral accountability,

and

likelihood that the target person will struggle to get what
he or she wants in l i f e ) , significance levels for the
relevant ANOVA effects did not change,

therefore,

significant ANOVA effects will be reported.
pairs of dependent measures,

only the

Third,

for all

Pearson product-moment

correlations were computed collapsing across levels of
situational possibility and personality similarity for
perpetrators and victims.

All measures were scored as

7-point scales.
Checks on Manipulation
Subjects' perceptions of situational possibility is
crucial to the arousal of self-protective motives.

To
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ensure that subjects perceived an outcome as either very
likely or very unlikely to happen to them,
asked,

subjects were

"What is the likelihood that what happened to Susan

(or Henry, depending on the condition) could happen to you?"
Mean scores for this and other manipulation checks are
presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3, and corroborating pretest
results,

a main effect was found for situational

possibility,

F (1, 85) = 6.97, £ <

.01, with the relevant

situation judged as more likely to happen than the
nonrelevant situation.

Insert Table 1 about here

It will become important to note that although a
relative difference across levels of situational possibility
was found, a mean value of 3.96 (relevant situation) on a
7 -point scale hardly constitutes situational possibility in
any absolute sense.
Second,

to be sure that the target person and subject

were perceived as either very different from or very similar
to each other,

subjects were asked,

and Susan (or Henry)
and attitudes?"

"To what degree are you

similar in terms of beliefs, values,

Again,

as was found in pretesting,

the data
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in Table 1 show that subjects claimed less similarity to
Henry (different target person) than to Susan (similar
target person),

F (1, 85) ■= 10.74, p <

.01.

Insert Table 2 about here

Because intelligence and likeability have been shown to
influence perceived similarity,

it was necessary to rule out

differences on those two variables (Lerner & Miller,
Subjects were asked,

1978).

"How intelligent would you estimate

Henry (or Susan) to be?," and "How much do you think you
would like Henry (or Susan)?"
pretesting,

As was the case in

there were no differences found for either

intelligence or likeability.

Manipulation of personal

similarity appears to have been successful.
Finally, because Shaver's (1970) original model deals
with attributions made to perpetrators and because defensive
attribution research has been criticized for not
distinguishing between perpetrators and victims,

it was

important that the perpetrator be clearly perceived as such.
Subjects were asked,

"To what degree do you believe Henry

(or Susan) to be the perpetrator of harm to Susan (or
Henry)?" and "To what degree do you believe Henry (or Susan)
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to be the victim of the accident?"

As Table 1 shows,

for

both measures a main effect was found such that perpetrators
were perceived less as perpetrators than victims were,
85) = 7.51, p <

F (1,

.01.

Insert Table 3 about here

The point to be made here is that perpetrators were
perceived more as victims than as perpetrators, a
manipulation failure that casts doubt on the rest of the
r e sults.
Attributions of Responsibility
A significant two-way interaction was found in response
to the question,

"To what extent do you believe that Henry

(or Susan) was aware of the consequences that his

(or her)

actions would bring about," F (1, 85) = 7.07, £ <

.01,

suggesting that,

for relevant situations, victims were

thought more aware (means were 2.01,
and victims,

2.95 for perpetrators

respectively), but for nonrelevant situations,

perpetrators were thought more aware (means were 2.50,
for perpetrators and victims,
interaction that,

respectively).

1.74

A two-way

in this case, collapses across the

critical personal similarity factor, cannot meaningfully
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respond to any of Shaver's

(1970) original claims that

predict specific interactions among all three factors.
An analysis of the simple interaction between
situational possibility and personal similarity for
perpetrators only was conducted on all dependent measures
resulting in a single significant effect.
the question,

In response to

"to what degree was Susan's (or Henry's)

expressed emotionality appropriate to the event being
recalled?," subjects indicated that a similar perpetrator
was thought to have expressed either the most appropriate or
the least appropriate affect depending on the situational
relevance F (1, 85) = 4.76, p <

.05,

(means were 4.54,

for high and low situational possibility,

3.23

respectively).

There were no other significant effects found for the
critical situational possibility x personal similarity
interaction for perpetrators.
Although the analysis of variance did reveal three
significant three-way interactions, none of them deals with
measures that are central to the defensive attribution
hypothesis.

Insert Table 4 about here
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First,

a significant effect was found when subjects

were asked to evaluate "To what degree was Henry's

(or

Susan's) expressed emotionality appropriate to the event
being recalled?," F (1, 85) = 4 . 7 5 ,

p <

.05, such that a

similar perpetrator in a highly possible situation and a
different victim in an unlikely situation were judged to
have expressed the most and least appropriate affect,
respectively.

Second,

did Henry (or Susan)

subjects were asked,

"to what extent

intentionally cause the accident?," and

again the analysis revealed a signficant effect indicating
that, given an unlikely situation,

a similar perpetrator was

thought to have acted the most intentionally, whereas the
similar victim, not surprisingly, was thought to have acted
the least intentionally,

F (1, 85) = 3.85, p <

.05.

A final

three-way interaction was found in response to the question,
"to what extent would you like to become better acquainted
with Henry (or Susan)?," F (1, 85) = 4 . 9 8 ,

p < .05,

suggesting that subjects were most interested in friendship
with a similar perpetrator in a situation that has
implications for their own lives and least interested in
getting to know a victim with whom they do not identify in a
situation that is not relevant to themselves.
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Judgments Based on Situational Possibility
Eight questions dealt with attributions of
responsibility and, as expected,

the analysis of variance

revealed significant differences (main effects) based on
situational possibility on nearly all of these items.
example,

For

compared with subjects in the situationally

nonrelevant condition,

subjects in the situationally

relevant condition said that the target person was more the
direct cause,

F (1, 85) = 9 . 0 6 ,

£ < .01,

(means were 3.57,

2.62 for high and low situational possibility,
respectively); better able to foresee,
<

.001,

(means were 3.85,

F (1, 85) = 12.04, p

2.70 for high and low,

respectively); more responsible,

F (1, 85) = 9.43, p < .01,

(means were 3.72, 2.85 for high and low, respectively);
better able to prevent, F (1, 85) = 4 . 8 9 ,

p <

.05,

were 5.20, 4.40 for high and low, respectively)

and

(means

the

a ccident.
Other main effects for situational possibility that
were not central to the defensive model,

included

exaggerated attributions to the specific actions,
= 6.85, p <

.01,

(means were 4.54,

respectively); moral character,
(means were 3.91,

F (1, 85)

3.68 for high and low,

F (1, 85) = 5.86, p < .05,

2.98 for high and low, respectively);

and
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personal nature,
3.98,

F (1, 85) = 14.44, £ <

.001,

(means were

2.60 for high and low, respectively) of the target

person in the situationally relevant versus the
situationally nonrelevant condition.
F (1, 85) = 4 . 6 7 ,

£ < .05,

Attribution to chance,

(means were 4.52,

5.23 for high

and low, respectively) which is central to Shaver's (1970)
model, was the only measure that did not increase in this
same direction,

such that where situational relevance was

low, subjects attributed the accident more to chance than
did subjects in the situationally relevant condition.
Judgments Based on Personal Similarity
The analysis of variance further revealed significant
differences based on personal similarity such that subjects
judged similar target persons as more likely to have been
coerced,

F (1, 85) = 12.75, £ < .001,

(means were 2.75,

for different and similar target person,
better adjusted,

F (1,85) = 4 . 2 0 ,

4.86 for different and similar,
indicate favorability.

respectively); and

£ < .05,

(means were 4.27,

respectively), both of which

This same target person (similar)

was, at the same time, judged to be more responsible,
85) = 9.59, £ <
and similar,

.01,

3.96

(means were 2.84,

F (1,

3.67 for different

respectively) for the accident,

a finding that

is inconsistent with the more favorable judgments already

Motivated Distortion
33

reported.

One item, a subjective probability estimate,

not follow this same pattern.

When asked,

did

"how likely is it

that the accident would have occurred regardless of any
action by the target person?," subjects indicated greater
probability for the different target person, F (1, 85) =
5.09, £ < .05,
similar,

(means were 3.96,

3.06 for different and

respectively).

Judgments Based on Target Person
The last category of significant main effects deals
with target person differences.
more for the accident,

Perpetrators were blamed

F (1, 85) = 4.12, £ <

were 3.66, 2.86 for perpetrator and victim,

.05,

(means

respectively);

their actions were perceived as more causally connected to
the accident,

F (1, 85) = 2 1 . 7 0 ,

3.34 for perpetrator and victim,
questionable moral character,
(means were 3.92,

£ <

.001,

(means were 4.80,

respectively); were of more

F (1, 85) = 7.16, £ <

.01,

2.91 for perpetrator and victim,

respectively); and were held more morally accountable for
their behavior than were victims,
(means were 4.16,
r espectively).

F (1, 85) = 5 . 4 8 ,

.05,

3.30 for perpetrator and victim,

Paradoxically,

subjects had a more positive

opinion of perpetrators than victims,
.05,

£ <

F (1, 85) = 5 . 2 7 ,

(means were 4.91, 4.32 for perpetrator and victim,

£ <
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respectively).
Relationships Among Measures
Pea r s o n ’s product-moment correlational analysis yielded
one noteworthy significant relationship, namely a confusing
positive correlation between perpetrator and victim,
= .33, p <

r (93)

.01, where an inverse relation was expected.

According to subjects,

the more a target person was

perceived to be a perpetrator,

the more he or she was

likewise perceived to be a victim.

Although it is true that

an individual can, at once, be both a perpetrator and
victim,

a major purpose of the present study was to

disentangle the two.

This may, however,

simply not be

possible.

For example,

in both the hospital and hunting

vignettes,

the perpetrator (Henry or Susan depending on the

condition) was responsible for the accident in an objective causality sense,
condemnation.

the punishment for which might be self-

In that sense then, a perpetrator of harm may

also be perceived as a victim of hers or his own guilt.
problem becomes one of knowing how subjects conceptualize
these subtle distinctions and whether they apply (a) just
world theory to a perceived victim,

(b) defensive

attribution to a perceived perpetrator,

or (c) neither.

The
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Discussion
Based on these data,

it is fair to conclude that

defensive attribution claims were not supported.
important to note, however,

It is

that these data do not provide

unequivocal disconfirmation of the defensive attribution
hypothesis, because none of the predicted interactions on
the major dependent variables (responsibility, blame,
chance,
Still,

similarity to target person) was significant.
lack of significant interactions between situational

possibility and personal similarity on the critical
dependent measures is a very real problem.
the theory?

Do we toss out

Or might there have been some methodological

reason why these results did not support Shaver's (1970)
predictions?
To answer that question,
Burger's
research.

one might first refer to

(1981) meta-analysis of defensive attribution
Certain conclusions drawn by Burger (1981) bear

repeating in the present context.

First,

it was concluded

that research strongly supports the defensive attribution
hypothesis when observers were personally and situationally
similar to the accident perpetrator.

Second,

experiments

using stronger subject-involving manipulations appeared more
likely to produce evidence in support of Shaver's

(1970)
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model than did experiments with low-involvement
manipulations.

And third,

future research should more

carefully specify whether the target person is a perpetrator
or victim.

Each conclusion will be addressed in turn.

That research strongly supports Shaver's (1970)
relevance-dependent model of defensive attribution is
justification enough to continue working toward overcoming
methodological difficulties that have plagued researchers.
Apparently,

though,

failed to do so.

the present study was yet another that

Responding to Burger's

about the "paper and pencil"

(1981) comment

(low-involvement) nature of

many defensive attribution studies,

the present research

showcased target persons on videotape in a manner designed
to be highly involving to subjects.

This particular method

had not been used before in defensive attribution research.
Target persons were drama students (male and female)
who,

on videotape,

told the story of being either the victim

of an accident or the perpetrator of harmdoing to another
(depending on the condition,

the male or female was either

the perpetrator or the victim).
during debriefing,

Based on subject feedback

it became clear that subjects had

strongly reacted to the visual images and performances of
the videotaped actors.

The criticisms that were verbalized

Motivated Distortion
37

most were all directed at the female target person (Susan)
whether she was the perpetrator or the victim.
in the nonrelevant condition,

For example,

subjects expressed disapproval

of Susan (the perpetrator) who, had she not been so easily
persuaded to ignore her own convictions

(about deerhunting),

would not have accidently shot her brother Henry (the
victim).

Where Susan was instead the victim of a hunting

accident,

subjects again believed that by not refusing to

take part in what she called animal slaughter,
inadvertently set up her own victimization.

Susan

Likewise,

subjects in the relevant condition criticized Susan (the
perpetrator)

for unwittingly dispensing penicillin to an

allergic patient even though a hospital emergency had called
away all personnel and the patient could have died without
antibiotic.
who,

Finally,

subjects rebuked Susan (the victim)

although intelligent, was not smart enough to make sure

that no one gave her medication to which she was allergic.
In light of all this,

it is easy to see that subjects

saw Susan the perpetrator (in both the hunting and hospital
situations)

as the victim of unnecessary trauma, and Susan

the victim (in both the hunting and hospital situations) as
someone who, by not avoiding victimization, was in a way the
perpetrator of her own mishap.

Hence,

conceptions about who
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is a perpetrator versus who is a victim become enmeshed as
do strategies for judging responsibility for each.

It is

also important to note that subjects said that Susan did not
"act" as though she had experienced trauma of any kind.

The

salience of a live performance apparently overwhelmed
subjects who perhaps reacted more to the target person's
appearance, affect,

and bad acting than to the

m anipulations.
To strengthen the case for methodological difficulty as
opposed to bad theory, one must look also at the
effectiveness of the relevance manipulations.

Yes,

significant differences were found for situational
possibility and personal similarity, but only for the latter
was the mean score just barely on the high side of the
midpoint.

Apparently,

subjects did not identify all that

strongly even with the similar target person.
score on the low side of the midpoint,

With a mean

it could hardly be

said that subjects found the highly possible situation
relevant enough to arouse the crucial self-protective
defensive motive.

Eyeballing the mean scores for all

significant effects, what stands out most is their failure,
in nearly all cases,
example,

to exceed a value of four.

For

a significant three-way interaction was found for
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degree to which the target person intended to cause the
accident--but the range of mean scores for all eight
conditions was from 1.23 to 2.30.
speaking,

Although,

relatively-

there were significant differences between

c o nditions, it cannot be inferred that intent was strong in
any absolute sense.
(means were 5.10,
situations,
were 2.00,

Even though situational possibility

2.20 for the hospital and hunting

respectively) and personal similarity (means
5.10 for Henry and Susan, respectively) had been

pretested (paper and pencil)

for effectiveness,

these

results suggest that subjects respond differently to target
persons on videotape.
Two conclusions can be drawn from these data.

First,

the evidence does not refute Shaver's (1970) defensive
attribution hypothesis--it was not fairly tested.

Second,

what seemed like a reasonable way to enhance realism and get
subjects more involved (presenting target persons on
videotape)

resulted in yet another methodological fiasco.

Future research certainly should continue to work at
building in experimental realism.

Apparently,

subjects do

respond to a live performance, but the response should be to
the stimulus story and not just to the person delivering it.
Target persons should,

in the future, be pretested to ensure
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that (a) their appearance and demeanor are as neutral as
possible,

and (b) self-presentation (actor) does not elicit

differential subject response.

Because the strength of the

critical situational possibility manipulation was
questionable,

it might be a good idea to preselect a sample

for whom a particular negative event would be especially
threatening.
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Table 1
Manipulation Check on Situational Possibility

Dependent
Measure

Happen To You

Situational Possibility
HI

LO

n=46

n=47

3.96

2.81
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Table 2
Manipulation Check on Personal Similarity

Dependent
Measure

Similarity

Personal Similarity
DIFF

SIM

n=44

n=49

3.23

4.53
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Table 3
Manipulation Check on Target Person

Dependent
Measure

Target Person
P

V

n=49

n=44

Perpetrator

2.18

3.09

Victim

3.76

5.59
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Table 4
Mean Scores on Attributions of Responsibi1ity by Situational
Possibility, Personal Similarity, and Target Person

Sitpossblty:

High

Low

Depend

Prsnsimilar:

Differ

Similar

Measures

Target Prsn:

P

V

n:

12

11

13

10

Emotionality

3.50

3.64

4.54

Intentionality

1.67

2.09

Acquaintance

4.25

4.36

P

V

Differ
P

Similar
V

P

V

11

10

13

13

4.00

4.18

2.50

3.23

3.77

1.54

2.30

2.09

2.00

2.10

1.23

5.00

3.50

4.45

3.30

3.54

3.62
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Susan is a 19 year old college sophomore from Northern
Virginia.

Her high school credentials were excellent,

and

because Susan wanted to compete for a place in the business
world she was encouraged to select a college with a
reputation for academic rigor.

Although Susan is a self-

described conservative whose politics and general lifestyle
lean toward the "traditional," she intends to postpone
marriage and family until after her career is settled.

But,

she admits that marriage would not be out of the question if
she meets the right man.

Susan is convinced that in a

cooperative relationship both parties can pursue independent
careers.

Having children,

be put off for awhile.
graduate school,

on the other hand, would have to

Rather than going directly into

Susan plans to see how marketable she is

with an undergraduate

business degree.

know in exactly which

area of industry she wants to

concentrate,
sense.

Besides, she

doesn't

so sampling her "real world" options makes good

Like most college students,

Susan has been known to

sometimes spend all night finishing an assignment that's
been put off till the last minute.

But,

for the most part,

she is a conscientious worker who is well aware that to
compete for admission

in a good graduate program (if

when she is ready to make that move) she has got

and

to stay on
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top of her studies.

Certainly,

the caliber of

undergraduates at the college where she now attends will
force her to be sharp and work hard.
In addition to her affiliation with the college
Republicans, part of Susan's free time is spent planning
community activities with a local Christian group.

Running

and lifting weights are also part of Susan's weekly regimen.
Staying in shape and feeling good are important to her,
besides,

exercising with friends is fun.

and

Susan describes

herself as outgoing and interested in meeting new people.
Sorority life and commitments made thereto take up much of
her time, but the friendship and social benefits make it
worth her while.

Movies,

concerts,

and intercollegiate

sports are favorite things to do, with sports events
generating the least enthusiasm of the three.
taste ranges from Springsteen and Prince,
U 2 , and the Police.

Her musical

to Talking Heads,
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Henry is a 19 year old sophomore from Topanga Canyon,
California.

His high school credentials were excellent,

and

because no one in his family had ever gone to a preppy
Eastcoast college, he decided to be the first.

So far,

Henry doesn't regret having spent the time, he just doesn't
believe that the real meaning of life has anything whatever
to do with capitalist money making.

He says he'll be

content to take his degree back to the clean air of Topanga,
live the good life, and maybe think about graduate school
sometime down the road.

Henry is a self-described liberal

whose politics and lifestyle tend to focus on community
welfare.

He sees himself as a sojourner in life who just

takes things as they c o m e .

The idea of marriage does not

appeal to Henry in the least.

While Henry likes getting

respectable grades, he doesn't believe in spending all of
his time studying.

Besides, he's a math wizard who

apparently doesn't have to kill himself to do well.

Because

graduate school is a possibility for the future, Henry does
have to stay competitive.
A good deal of Henry's time is spent in the out-ofdoors.

He describes himself as a community person who

enjoys good conversation with all kinds of people.

While

fraternity life intrigues Henry he doesn't feel that he'd
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quite fit in.
to do.

Old movies and concerts are favorite things

Henry cannot figure out why everyone is obsessed

with exercise and slimness.

He is convinced that health is

a function of putting only essential foods into one's
system.

Henry feels out of place some of the time, but says

that he's living life according to his convictions.
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This vignette satisfies the following experimental conditions:
(1) low situational possibility x similar person (Susan)
x perpetrator.
(2) low situational possibility x different person (Henry)
x victim.
Susan and Henry were spending fall break with their
grandparents in Northern Michigan.

It was deer season,

always Henry was going hunting with their grandfather.
were kids,

and as
When they

Susan had gone with her brother and grandfather several

times.

They had even taught her how to

use a rifle.

though,

Susan's attitude toward hunting

had

As an adult,

changed a lot. She

thought it seemed more like animal slaughter than sport.

But her

brother explained that were it not for hunting to check the deer
population,

they'd eventually starve to

refresher course in rifle shooting.
October,
awesome.

It

death.

He even gave her a

was the second week

in

and in Michigan's Upper Peninsula the colors were
Susan decided to join Henry if for no other reason than

to experience the gorgeous out-of-doors.

Their grandfather

decided to stay behind--he didn't feel quite up to it this year.
Henry and Susan drove to a favorite hunting place.

They had just

begun their trek though the woods when Henry gestured for her to
keep still and hand over his rifle.

Susan was suddenly very
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nervous about all of this.
mistake to come.

She realized that it had been a

She started to pass the gun to her brother--

barrell first--when she stumbled--and in so doing, brushed against
the trigger.

Apparently,

Susan had forgotten to check the safety.

The gun went off, and at point blank range,
Henry's thigh.

His left leg is paralyzed.

the bullet shattered
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This vignette satisfies the following experimental conditions:
(1) low situational possibility x different person (Henry)
x perpetrator.
(2) low situational possibility x similar person (Susan)
x victim.
Susan and Henry were spending fall break with their
grandparents in Northern Michigan.

It was deer season, and as

always Henry was going hunting with their grandfather.
were kids,

When they

Susan had gone with her brother and grandfather several

times.

They had even taught her how

to use a rifle.

though,

Susan's attitude toward hunting

As an adult,

had changed a lot. She

thought it seemed more like animal slaughter than sport.

But her

brother explained that were it not for hunting to check the deer
population,

t h e y ’d eventually starve

refresher course in rifle shooting.
October,
awesome.

to death.

He even gave her a

It was the second week in

and in Michigan's Upper Peninsula the colors were
Susan decided to join Henry if for no other reason than

to experience the gorgeous out-of-doors.

Their grandfather

decided to stay behind--he didn't feel quite up to it this year.
Henry and Susan drove to a favorite hunting place.

They had just

begun their trek though the woods when Henry gestured for her to
keep still and crouch down.
all of this.

Susan was suddenly very nervous about

She realized that it had been a mistake to come.

Motivated Distortion
53

Carrying his rifle, Henry stepped up on a log to get a better look
and in so doing slipped on a patch of moss that was on top of the
log.

Apparently, he had neglected to check the safety.

In

slipping, he brushed against the trigger and the gun fired-shattering Susan's thigh.

Her left leg is paralyzed.
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This vignette satisfies the following experimental conditions:
(1) high situational possibility x similar person (Susan)
x perpetrator.
(2) high situational possibility x different person (Henry)
x victim.
Susan was a part-time volunteer at the community hospital.
As a business major, she thought the hospital setting would
provide an excellent opportunity to observe big business from the
inside.

It was also true that the idea of volunteer work appealed

to her.

A patient had just been admitted with an undiagnosed

infection.

Until he could be scheduled for tests, Henry's raging

fever was being controlled with antibiotics administered every
four hours.
emergency.

The attending nurse was suddenly called away on an
Apparently,

there had been a schoolbus crash and

nurses were needed for triage.

In all the commotion, Henry had

not been attended to--and he was due for his next dose of
antibiotic.

All prescribed antibiotics were clearly marked and

kept on a tray just inside the nurses'

station.

Henry had just

rung for the nurse saying that his head was pounding and he was
burning up.
his medicine.

Susan decided it would be a simple matter to give him
She knew that prolonged high fever could cause

convulsions and subsequent brain damage.

What she didn't know was

that someone in Admissions had neglected to "flag" Henry's chart

Motivated Distortion
55

with a penicillin allergy sticker.

Because penicillin is

routinely the antibiotic of choice for treatment of high fever,
Susan automatically gave Henry precisely that.
allergic shock.

Henry went into

The membranes that line the air pathways

practically swelled shut--he couldn't breathe.

Henry almost died.
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This vignette satisfies the following experimental conditions:
(1) high situational possibility x different person (Henry)
x perpetrator.
(2) high situational possibility x similar person (Susan)
x victim.
Henry was a part-time volunteer at the community hospital.
Given his attitude toward the "capitalist mentality," he saw this
as an excellent opportunity to scoff at big business from the
inside.

It was also true that the idea of volunteer work appealed

to Henry's sincere concern for public welfare.
been admitted with an undiagnosed infection.
scheduled for tests,

A patient had just
Until she could be

Susan's raging fever was being controlled

with antibiotics administered every four hours.

The attending

nurse was suddenly called away on an emergency.

Apparently,

there

had been a schoolbus crash and nurses were needed for triage.
all the commotion,

In

Susan had not been attended to--and she was due

for her next dose of antibiotic.

All prescribed antibiotics were

clearly marked and kept on a tray just inside the nurses'

station.

Susan had just rung for the nurse saying that her head was
pounding and she was burning up.

Henry decided it would be a

simple matter to give Susan her medicine.

He knew that prolonged

high fever could cause convulsions and subsequent brain damage.
What he didn't know was that someone in Admissions had neglected
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to "flag" Susan's chart with a penicillin allergy sticker.
Because penicillin is routinely the antibiotic of choice for
treatment of high fever, Henry automatically gave Susan precisely
that.

Susan went into allergic shock.

The membranes that line

the air pathways practically swelled shut--she couldn't breathe.
Susan almost died.
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Script
Hi, my name is Hedy Dexter and I'm doing graduate research in
psychology.

I'm currently working on a project having to do with

communication skill and its impact on self-efficacy.

It is

generally agreed that self-efficacy is contingent upon an
individual's communication skill.

In order to attain a measure of

gratification in life, whether it be in the workplace or in
personal relationships,

one must be able to communicate personal

needs and expectations to involved parties.

Regrettably,

communication skills have not typically been emphasized.

Owing to

the current focus on realization of self-potential, research is
being done to facilitate effective interpersonal communication.
If you agree to participate all you must do is view a
videotaped dialogue between two individuals one of whom will be
recounting the details of some traumatic life event to the other.
These videotapes had been developed previously in research
investigating the therapeutic value of client-disclosure for the
client's own use.

may seem too laboratory-like, but complex

research of this sort requires isolation of the various elements
of the communication process.

Before viewing the videotape, you

will be given a personality "sketch" of the individual to whom
your attention should be focused.

Afterward,

I'll ask you to

evaluate his or her communication skills the effectiveness of
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which will be measured by how accurately you perceive what goes on
in the videotaped dialogue.

Also,

I ’d like you to summarize the

communicator's strengths and shortcomings relative to yourselves.
Please do not talk or make any emotional displays in response to
the materials that will be shown on the screen.
last no more than 30 minutes.

The session will

If you'll help me, I need you to

read this consent form carefully and to sign and date it when you
have finished.

You'll notice that your responses will remain

anonymous and you may refuse to answer any time you find questions
that are personally objectionable.

Also,

if you would like a copy

of the results when the study is completed, please print your name
and address on the address labels stapled to the consent form.
(PRESENT CONSENT FORM.
COLLECT CONSENT FORM.
DIALOGUE.

WHEN THE SUBJECT HAS FINISHED,

TURN ON VHS FOR SUBJECT VIEWING OF THE

PASS OUT QUESTIONNAIRES).

ponder each question.

It is not necessary to

Just answer quickly and honestly.

(STIMULUS MATERIALS ARE COLLECTED.)
(IF NONE,

I'LL CONTINUE.)

Are there any questions?

Was there any aspect of the procedure

that you found odd, confusing, or disturbing?
I'LL CONTINUE.)
up.

(IF NO RESPONSE,

We're a small group here--so feel free to speak

Why do you think I asked you to make attributions of

causality,

responsibility,

and blame to the target person?

(

Why do you think I asked you the likelihood that this particular

)
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situation could happen to you?
him or her?

(

)

(

)

Or how similar you are to

Did you feel like I was asking you to make

foolish judgments about unrealistic individuals in an irrelevant
context,

or was there something about the situation or the people

therein to which you could relate?

(

)

Well,

some of you have

probably guessed that I've oversimplified my purpose here.

My

study is actually designed to investigate whether or not
situational possibility and personal similarity influence how
people make responsibility attributions.
So far, evidence has been found for two self-protective
motives that influence a perceiver's responsibility judgments.

My

study uses Shaver's model of defensive attribution which deals
with attributions made to perpetrators of harmdoing to another.
Prerequisite to the "defensive" process is situational
pos s i bility, a perceiver's subjective likelihood of being a
potential perpetrator of misfortune,
would want to avoid.

the blame for which he or she

Given situational possibility,

the degree of

perceived personal similarity determines whether responsibility is
attributed to the perpetrator or bad luck.
I told you instead that I wanted you first to evaluate the
communication skills of a target person and then summarize his or
her communication strengths and shortcomings relative to
y o u r s elves.

The reason for this was to encourage maximum
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involvement by making the context highly relevant.
that you take your participation here seriously.

It was crucial
Realize, please,

that while I didn't enjoy misleading you, I sincerely believed
that it was unavoidable.

It's not easy to reveal potentially

undesirable social judgments.

The process by which attributions

of responsibility are made for outcomes resulting in harm to
someone are typically resistant to probing.

A "cover story,"

therefore, was necessary in order to elicit your honest response.
I'm always searching for ways to improve research design.

As

subjects, can you suggest how this experimental procedure could be
more powerful,

credible,

or pleasant?

Now that you have heard all about the study, we need your
permission to score your data.

If you'd like to give us your

permission, please sign on the second line at the bottom of the
form.

Thank you again for participating.
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1.

How well did Susan enunciate?
Not at all
well

2.

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Extremely
well

How suitable was Susan’s speaking tempo?
Not at all
suitable

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Extremely
suitable

To what degree was Susan's expressed emotionality
appropriate to the event being recalled?
Not at all
appropriate

4.

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Extremely
consistent

To what extent do you believe that Susan was the direct
cause as opposed to an indirect contributing cause of her
own victimization?
Not at all
the cause

6.

Extremely
appropriate

To what degree was Susan's communication style
consistent with what you know about her background?
Not at all
consistent

5.

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Completely
the cause

To What extent do you believe that Susan’s actions were
coerced as opposed to voluntary?
Not at all
coerced

Completely
coerced
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To what extent do you believe that Susan was aware of the
consequences that her actions would bring about?
Completely
aware

Not at all
aware

How foreseeable do you think the accident should
have been to Susan?
Not at all
foreseeable

9.

To what extent did Susan intentionally cause the
accident?
Not at all
intentional

10.

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Completely
intentional

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____:

Completely
justified

To what extent do you believe
Susan was responsible
for the injury that she suffered?
Not at all
responsible

12.

:

To what extent were Susan's actions justified?
Not at all
justified

11.

Completely
foreseeable

:__ :___ :____ :____:____ :___ :___ :

Completely
responsible

To what extent do you believe
Susan was to blame
for the injury that she suffered?
Not at all
to blame

Completely
to blame
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13.

How strongly do you feel that what happened to Susan was a
result of chance?
Not at all
chance

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Completely
chance

:

14. How strongly do you feel that there were actions that Susan
could have taken to prevent what happened to her?
Not at all
able to prevent

:____:__ :____ :___ :____:___ :

15. To what extent do
otherwise?
Not at all
able to
do otherwise

16.

you

believe

:

Completely
able to prevent

that Susan could have done

:____:__ :____:___ :____:___ :____ :

Completely
able to
do otherwise

How strongly do you feel that what happened to Susan was a
result of her own actions?

Not at all
her own actions

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Completely
her own actions

17. How much do you think you would like Susan?
Not at all

:___ :____ :__ :____:___ :___ :____ :

Extremely

18. To what degree is your overall opinion of Susan positive'
Not at all
positive

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :

Extremely
positive
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19.

Do you think that the moral character of Susan in any way
influenced what happened to her?
Not at all
influenced

20.

:

:

:

:

:

:

Completely
influenced

:

To what extent can Susan be considered responsible for what
happened to her because of the kind of person she is?
Not at all
responsible

21.

:

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :

:

Completely
responsible

To what degree would you say Susan is a well-adjusted person?
Not at all
well-adjusted

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :

:

Extremely
well-adjusted

22. How intelligent would you estimate Susan to be?
Not at all
intelligent
23.

How much would you like working with
Not at all
like working
with her

24.

:___ :___ :____:____:____ :__:____:

Extremely
intelligent

Susan in an experiment?

:___ :___ :____:____:____ :__:____:

Extremely
like working
with her

How morally accountable do you believe Susan was for her
behavior?
Not at all
accountable

Completely
accountable
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25.

How likely is it that the accident would have occurred
regardless of any action by Susan?
Not at all
likely

26.

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____:

Completely
likely

To what extent would you like to become better acquainted
with Susan?
Not at all

:___ :___ :____:___ :___ :___ :____:

Extremely

27. How easily would Susan fit in with your friends?
Not at all
fit in

28.

:

:

:

:

:

:

Completely
fit in

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____:

Extremely
likely

How likely is it that Susan will have to struggle for
what she wants?
Not at all
likely

30.

:

From the impression Susan gives, how likely is it that
what she wants out of life will come very easily?
Not at all
likely

29.

:

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :

Extremely
likely

To what degree can you put yourself in Susan's shoes?
Not at all

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____:

Completely
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31.

To

what degree do

Not at all

you

feel sorry for Susan?

:___:___ :____:___ :_____ :___ :__ :

Completely

32. What is the likelihood that what happened to Susan could
happen to you?
Not at all
likely

33.

:___:___ :____:___ :_____ :___ :__ :

To
what degree do
of the accident?
Not at all
the victim

:

:

you

:

:

believe

:

:

:

Completely
likely

Susan to be the victim

:

Completely
the victim

34. To what degree do you believe Henry to be the perpetrator
of harm to Susan?
Not at all
the perpetrator

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :

Completely
the perpetrator

35. To what degree are you and Susan similar in terms of
beliefs, values, and attitudes?
Not at all
similar

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Extremely
similar
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Just World Scale
1.

I've found that a person rarely deserves the reputation he has
Completely
disagree

2.

Basically,

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____:

Completely
agree

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :

Completely
agree

It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off
free in American co u r t s .
Completely
disagree

6.

Completely
agree

Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic
accidents as careless ones.
Completely
disagree

5.

:___ :__ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :

People who get "lucky breaks" have usually earned their good
fortune.
Completely
disagree

4.

Completely
agree

the world is a just place.

Completely
disagree

3.

:___ :__ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____:

Completely
agree

Students almost always deserve the grades they receive
in school.
Completely
disagree

Completely
agree
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7.

Men who keep in shape have little chance of suffering a
heart attack.
Completely
disagree

:___ :___ :___ :____:___ :___ :

:

Completely
agree

The political candidate who sticks up for his principles
rarely gets elected.
Completely
disagree

:___ :___ :____:___ :___ :____ :___ :

It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly
Completely
disagree

10.

Completely
agree

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____:

Completely
agree

By and large, people deserve what they get.
Completely
disagree

12.

sent to jail

In professional sports, many fouls and infractions never
get called by the referee.
Completely
disagree

11.

:___ :___ :____:___ :___ :____ :___ :

Completely
agree

:___ :___ :___ :____:___ :___ :____:

When parents punish their children,
for good reasons.
Completely
disagree

Completely
agree

it is almost always

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :

Completely
agree
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13. Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded.
Completely
disagree

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____:

:

Completely
agree

14. Although evil men may hold political power for a while,
in the general course of history good wins out.
Completely
disagree

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :

15. In almost any business or profession,
job will rise to the top.
Completely
disagree

16.

people who do their

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :

Completely
agree

American parents tend to overlook the things most to be
admired in their children.
Completely
disagree

17.

Completely
agree

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____:

Completely
agree

It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair
trial in the USA.
Completely
disagree

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____:

Completely
agree

18. People who meet with misfortune have often brought it
on themselves.
Completely
disagree

Completely
agree
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19. Crime doesn't pay.
Completely
disagree

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____:

Completely
agree

20. Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own.
Completely
disagree

:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____:

Completely
agree
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